

Syntax of propositional logic

An **atomic formula** has the form A_i where $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots$

Formulas are defined by the following inductive process:

1. All atomic formulas are formulas
2. For every formula F , $\neg F$ is a formula.
3. For all formulas F und G , $(F \wedge G)$ and $(F \vee G)$ are formulas.

For $(F \wedge G)$ we say F and G , conjunction of F and G


For $(F \vee G)$ we say F or G , disjunction of F and G

For $\neg F$ we say not F , negation of F

Syntax tree of a formula


Every formula can be represented by a syntax tree.

Example: $F = \neg((\neg A_4 \vee A_1) \wedge A_3)$



Subformulas

The **subformulas** of a formula are the formulas corresponding to the subtrees of its syntax tree.



Semantics of propositional logic (I)

The elements of the set $\{0, 1\}$ are called **truth values**.

An **assignment** is a function $\mathcal{A}: D \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where D is any subset of the atomic formulas.

In case $D = \{A_i \mid i \in X\}$ for some finite set $X \subset \mathbb{N}$ we sometimes also write $\{(A_i, \mathcal{A}(A_i)) \mid i \in X\}$ to denote \mathcal{A} .

We extend \mathcal{A} to a function $\hat{\mathcal{A}}: E \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where $E \supseteq D$ is the set of formulas that can be built up using only the atomic formulas from D .

Semantics of propositional logic (II)

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\mathcal{A}}(A) &= \mathcal{A}(A) \quad \text{if } A \in D \text{ is an atomic formula} \\ \hat{\mathcal{A}}((F \wedge G)) &= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \hat{\mathcal{A}}(F) = 1 \text{ and } \hat{\mathcal{A}}(G) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \hat{\mathcal{A}}((F \vee G)) &= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \hat{\mathcal{A}}(F) = 1 \text{ or } \hat{\mathcal{A}}(G) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \hat{\mathcal{A}}(\neg F) &= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \hat{\mathcal{A}}(F) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\end{aligned}$$

We write \mathcal{A} instead of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$.

Truth tables (I)

We can compute $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ with the help of [truth tables](#).

Observe: $\hat{\mathcal{A}}(F)$ depends only on the definition of \mathcal{A} on the atomic formulas that occur in F .

Tables for the operators \vee , \wedge , \neg :

A	B	A	\vee	B	A	B	A	\wedge	B	A	\neg	A
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0			
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			

Abbreviations

$A, B, C,$

$P, Q, R,$ or \dots for $A_1, A_2, A_3 \dots$

$(F_1 \rightarrow F_2)$ for $(\neg F_1 \vee F_2)$

$(F_1 \leftrightarrow F_2)$ for $((F_1 \wedge F_2) \vee (\neg F_1 \wedge \neg F_2))$

$(\bigvee_{i=1}^n F_i)$ for $(\dots ((F_1 \vee F_2) \vee F_3) \vee \dots \vee F_n)$

$(\bigwedge_{i=1}^n F_i)$ for $(\dots ((F_1 \wedge F_2) \wedge F_3) \wedge \dots \wedge F_n)$

\top or **true** or 1 for $(A_1 \vee \neg A_1)$

\perp or **false** or 0 for $(A_1 \wedge \neg A_1)$

Truth tables (II)

Tables for the operators \rightarrow , \leftrightarrow :

A	B	A	\rightarrow	B
0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	1
1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1

Name: *implication*

Interpretation: If A holds, then B holds.

A	B	A	\leftrightarrow	B
0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1
1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1

Name: *equivalence*

Interpretation: A holds if and only if B holds.

Beware!!!

$A \rightarrow B$ does **not** say, that A is a cause of B .

“Penguins swim \rightarrow Horses neigh”
is true (in our world).

$A \rightarrow B$ does not say **anything** about the truth value of A .

“Ms. Merkel is a criminal \rightarrow Ms. Merkel should go to prison”
is true (in our world).

A false statement implies **anything**.

“Penguins fly \rightarrow Mr. Obama is a criminal”
is true (in our world).

Formalizing natural language (I)

A device consists of two parts A and B , and a red light. We know that:

- A or B (or both) are broken.
- If A is broken, then B is broken.
- If B is broken and the red light is on, then A is not broken.
- The red light is on.

We use the atomic formulas: Ro (red light on), Ab (A is broken), Bb (B is broken), and formalize this situation by means of the formula

$$((((Ab \vee Bb) \wedge (Ab \rightarrow Bb)) \wedge ((Bb \wedge Ro) \rightarrow \neg Ab))) \wedge Ro$$

Formalizing natural language (II)

Full truth table:

<i>Ro</i>	<i>Ab</i>	<i>Bb</i>	$(((((Ab \vee Bb) \wedge (Ab \rightarrow Bb)))) \wedge ((Bb \wedge Ro) \rightarrow \neg Ab)) \wedge Ro$
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0
0	1	1	0
1	0	0	0
1	0	1	1
1	1	0	0
1	1	1	0

Formalizing natural language (III)

Formalize the Sudoku problem:

4				9				2
		1				5		
	9		3	4	5		1	
		8				2	5	
7		5		3		4	6	1
	4	6				9		8
	6		1	5	9		8	
		9				6		
5				7				4

An atomic formula X_{YZ} for each triple $(X, Y, Z) \in \{1, \dots, 9\}^3$:

X_{YZ} = the square at row Y and column Z contains the number X

Example: The first row contains all digits from 1 to 9

$$\bigwedge_{X=1}^9 \left(\bigvee_{Z=1}^9 X_{1Z} \right)$$

The truth table has

2^{729} = 282401395870821749694910884220462786335135391185
157752468340193086269383036119849990587392099522
999697089786549828399657812329686587839094762655
308848694610643079609148271612057263207249270352
7723757359478834530365734912

rows.

Models

Let F be a formula and let \mathcal{A} be an assignment. \mathcal{A} is **suitable** for F if it is defined for every atomic formula A_i occurring in F .

Let \mathcal{A} be suitable for F :

If $\mathcal{A}(F) = 1$ then we write $\mathcal{A} \models F$
and say F holds under \mathcal{A}
or \mathcal{A} is a model of F

If $\mathcal{A}(F) = 0$ then we write $\mathcal{A} \not\models F$
and say F does not hold under \mathcal{A}
or \mathcal{A} is not a model of F

Validity and satisfiability

Validity: A formula F is **valid** (or a **tautology** if every suitable assignment for F is a model of F). We write $\models F$ if F is valid, and $\not\models F$ otherwise.

Satisfiability: A formula F is **satisfiable** if it has at least one model, otherwise F is **unsatisfiable**.

A (finite or infinite!) set of formulas S is **satisfiable** if there is an assignment that is a model of every formula in S .

Exercise


	Valid	Satisfiable	Unsatisfiable
A			
$A \vee B$			
$A \vee \neg A$			
$A \wedge \neg A$			
$A \rightarrow \neg A$			
$A \rightarrow B$			
$A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$			
$A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$			
$A \leftrightarrow \neg A$			

Exercise

Which of the following statements are true?

	Y/N	C.ex.
If F is valid, then F is satisfiable		
If F is satisfiable, then $\neg F$ is satisfiable		
If F is valid, then $\neg F$ is satisfiable		
If F is unsatisfiable, dann $\neg F$ is valid		

Mirroring principle



Consequence

A formula G is a **consequence** or **follows from** the formulas F_1, \dots, F_k if every model \mathcal{A} of F_1, \dots, F_k that is suitable for G is also a model of G

If G is a consequence of F_1, \dots, F_k then we write $F_1, \dots, F_k \models G$.

Consequence: example

$$\begin{aligned} & (Ab \vee Bb), (Ab \rightarrow Bb), \\ & ((Bb \wedge Ro) \rightarrow \neg Ab), Ro \models ((Ro \wedge \neg Ab) \wedge Bb) \end{aligned}$$

Exercise

M	F	$M \models F ?$
A	$A \vee B$	
A	$A \wedge B$	
A, B	$A \vee B$	
A, B	$A \wedge B$	
$A \wedge B$	A	
$A \vee B$	A	
$A, A \rightarrow B$	B	

Consequence, validity, satisfiability

The following assertions are equivalent:

1. $F_1, \dots, F_k \models G$, e.g. , G is a consequence of F_1, \dots, F_k .
2. $((\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) \rightarrow G)$ is valid.
3. $((\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) \wedge \neg G)$ is unsatisfiable.

Exercise

Let S be a set of formulas, and let F and G be formulas. Which of the following assertions hold?

	Y/N
If F satisfiable then $S \models F$.	
If F valid then $S \models F$.	
If $F \in S$ then $S \models F$.	
If $S \models F$ then $S \cup \{G\} \models F$.	
$S \models F$ and $S \models \neg F$ cannot hold simultaneously.	
If $S \models G \rightarrow F$ and $S \models G$ then $S \models F$.	