On the Decidability of Model Checking for Several μ-calculi and Petri Nets

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Abstract. The decidability of the model checking problem for several μ-calculi and Petri nets is analysed. The linear time μ-calculus without atomic sentences is decidable; if simple atomic sentences are added, it becomes undecidable. A very simple subset of the modal μ-calculus is undecidable.

1 Introduction

Research on decidability issues for Petri nets (or vector addition systems, a closely related model) has a long tradition. Two milestones are the introduction by Karp and Miller of coverability graphs [9] – which can be used to prove, among other properties, the decidability of boundedness – and the proof by Mayr and Kosaraju of the decidability of the reachability problem [12, 10]. A natural next step is to examine the decidability of the model checking problem for temporal logics able to express a large class of properties. This problem was first studied by Howell and Rosier in [6]; they observed that a simple linear time temporal logic is undecidable even for conflict-free Petri nets, a fairly small class. This logic is interpreted on the infinite occurrence sequences of the net, and consists of atomic sentences, the usual boolean connectives, and the operator **F** (eventually). The atomic sentences are of type $ge(s, c)$ (with intended meaning 'at the current marking, the number of tokens on place s is greater than or equal to c') or of type $fi(t)$ (with intended meaning 'transition t is the next one in the sequence'). In a subsequent paper [7], Howell, Rosier and Yen showed that the model checking problem for the positive fragment of this logic (in which negations are only applied to atomic sentences) can be reduced to the reachability problem, and is thus decidable. Jančar showed in [8] that the positive fragment with **GF** (always eventually) as operator, instead of **F**, is decidable as well.

We analyse in this paper the decidability of several μ-calculi, logics with fixpoint operators [15]. Our three results are:

- The linear time μ-calculus without atomic sentences is decidable.
- The linear time μ-calculus with atomic sentences of the form $s = 0$ – meaning 'at the current marking, the place s contains 0 tokens' – is undecidable,

even for formulas with one single fixpoint, and for Petri nets in which every transition has at most one input place and at most one output place.
- The modal μ-calculus is undecidable, even for formulas with one single fixpoint and for the same class of Petri nets.

The third result (which is a small modification of Theorem 5.4 in [1]) is not very surprising, because the modal μ-calculus is known to be a extremely powerful logic, which properly contains many branching time logics such as PDL, CTL or CTL*. Since the decidability of branching time logics seems not to have been explored so far, we complement the paper with a fourth result, unfortunately negative:

- a weak branching time subset of the modal μ-calculus, which extends propositional logic with possibility operators, is undecidable.

The note is organised as follows: sections 2 and 3 contain basic definitions about Petri nets and the linear time μ-calculus, respectively. Sections 4 and 5 prove the first and second results above. Section 6 proves the other two.

2 Petri Nets

A *labelled net* N is a fourtuple (S, T, F, l), where

- S and T are two disjoint, finite sets,
- F is a relation on $S \cup T$ such that $F \cap (S \times S) = F \cap (T \times T) = \emptyset$, and
- l is a surjective mapping $T \to Act$, where Act is a set of actions (surjectivity is assumed for convenience).

The elements of S and T are called *places* and *transitions*, respectively. Places and transitions are genericaly called *nodes*.

Given a node x of N, ${}^\bullet x = \{y \mid (y, x) \in F\}$ is the *preset* of x and $x^\bullet = \{y \mid (x, y) \in F\}$ is the *postset* of x.

Given a set of nodes X of N, we define ${}^\bullet X = \bigcup_{x \in X} {}^\bullet x$ and $X^\bullet = \bigcup_{x \in X} x^\bullet$.

A *marking* of N is a mapping $M: S \to \mathbb{N}$. A marking M *enables* a transition t if it marks every place in ${}^\bullet t$. If t is enabled at M, then it can *occur*, and its occurrence leads to the successor marking M' which is defined for every place s by

$$M'(s) = \begin{cases} M(s) & \text{if } s \notin {}^\bullet t \text{ and } s \notin t^\bullet \quad \text{or} \quad s \in {}^\bullet t \text{ and } s \in t^\bullet \\ M(s) - 1 & \text{if } s \in {}^\bullet t \text{ and } s \notin t^\bullet \\ M(s) + 1 & \text{if } s \notin {}^\bullet t \text{ and } s \in t^\bullet \end{cases}$$

(a token is removed from each place in the preset of t and a token is added to each place in the postset of t).

A marking M is called *dead* if it enables no transition of N.

A *labelled Petri net* is a pair $\Sigma = (N, M_0)$ where N is a labelled net and M_0 is a marking of N. The expression $M_1 \xrightarrow{a} M_2$, where M_1, M_2 are markings of N, denotes that M_1 enables some transition t labelled by a, and that the marking

reached by the occurrence of t is M_2. A sequence $M_0 \xrightarrow{a_1} M_1 \xrightarrow{a_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{a_n} M_n$ is a *finite occurrence sequence* leading from M to M_n and we write $M_0 \xrightarrow{a_1 \ldots a_n} M_n$. The empty sequence ϵ is an occurrence sequence: we have $M \xrightarrow{\epsilon} M$ for every marking M. A sequence $M_0 \xrightarrow{a_1} M_1 \xrightarrow{a_2} \cdots$ is an infinite occurrence sequence. We write $M \xrightarrow{a_1 a_2 \cdots}$.

We assume that if two transitions have the same label, then they do not have the same preset and postset. Under this assumption, every label of an occurrence sequence can be uniquely mapped to its underlying transition. Making implicit use of this property, we sometimes speak about the transitions that occur in an occurrence sequence.

A sequence of actions σ is *enabled* at a marking M if $M \xrightarrow{\sigma} M'$ for some marking M' (if σ is finite) or $M \xrightarrow{\sigma}$ (if σ is infinite).

An occurrence sequence is *maximal* if either it is infinite or it leads to a dead marking. The *language* of Σ, denoted by $L(\Sigma)$, is the set of words obtained by dropping the intermediate markings in the maximal occurrence sequences of Σ.

Unlabelled Petri nets are obtained from labelled ones by dropping the labelling function. Equivalently, one can think of unlabelled Petri nets as labelled Petri nets in which the labelling function assigns to a transition its own name. With this convention, the definition of language carries over to unlabelled Petri nets.

3 The Linear Time μ-calculus

The linear time μ-calculus without atomic sentences has the following syntax:

$$\phi ::= Z \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid O_a\phi \mid \nu Z.\phi$$

where a ranges over a set Act of *actions*, and Z over propositional variables. *Free* and *bound* occurrences of variables are defined as usual. A formula is *closed* if no variable occurs free in it.

Formulas are built out of this grammar, subject to the monotonicity condition that all free occurrences of X lie in the scope of an even number of negations.

Let $Act^\star$, Act^ω be the set of finite and infinite words on Act, and let $Act^\infty = Act^\star \cup Act^\omega$. A valuation $\mathcal{V}$ of the logic assigns to each variable X a set of words $\mathcal{V}(X)$ in Act^∞. We denote by $\mathcal{V}[W/Z]$ the valuation $\mathcal{V}'$ which agrees with $\mathcal{V}$ except on Z, where $\mathcal{V}'(Z) = W$. Given a word $\sigma = a_1\, a_2 \ldots$ on Act^∞, $\sigma(1)$ denotes the first action of σ, i.e., a_1, and σ^1 denotes the word $a_2\, a_3 \ldots$. With these notations, the denotation $\|\phi\|_\mathcal{V}$ of a formula ϕ is the set of words of Act^∞ inductively defined by the following rules:

$$\begin{aligned}
\|Z\|_\mathcal{V} &= \mathcal{V}(Z) \\
\|\neg\phi\|_\mathcal{V} &= Act^\infty - \|\phi\|_\mathcal{V} \\
\|\phi \wedge \psi\|_\mathcal{V} &= \|\phi\|_\mathcal{V} \cap \|\psi\|_\mathcal{V} \\
\|O_a\phi\|_\mathcal{V} &= \{\sigma \in Act^\infty \mid \sigma(1) = a \wedge \sigma^1 \in \|\phi\|_\mathcal{V}\} \\
\|\nu Z.\phi\|_\mathcal{V} &= \cup\{W \subseteq Act^\infty \mid W \subseteq \|\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}[W/Z]}\}
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\|\nu Z.\phi\|\nu$ is the greatest fixpoint of the function which assigns to a set W of words the set $\|\phi\|\nu[W/Z]$.

The denotation of a closed formula ϕ is independent of the valuation; we then use the symbol $\|\phi\|$. We also use the following abbreviations: $tt = \nu Z.Z$ and $\mu Z.\phi = \neg\nu Z.\phi[\neg Z/Z]$. Observe that $\|tt\| = Act^\infty$.

Let Σ be a labelled Petri net and ϕ a closed formula of the linear time μ-calculus. We say that Σ satisfies ϕ if $L(\Sigma) \subseteq \|\phi\|$. Notice that, with this definition of satisfaction, it can be the case that Σ satisfies neither a formula nor its negation.

4 Decidability of the Linear Time μ-calculus

We define the model checking problem for the linear time μ-calculus as follows: given a Petri net Σ and a closed formula ϕ, determine if Σ satisfies ϕ or not. We prove in this section that this problem is decidable. The decision procedure is based on an automata-theoretic characterisation of the logic [16]. We show that there exist two automata $A_{\neg\phi}$, $B_{\neg\phi}$ that accept the finite and infinite words of $\|\neg\phi\|$, respectively. It follows that Σ satisfies ϕ if and only if $L(\Sigma) \cap L(A_{\neg\phi}) = \emptyset$ and $L(\Sigma) \cap L(B_{\neg\phi}) = \emptyset$. To decide these two properties, we construct Petri net representations of $A_{\neg\phi}$ and $B_{\neg\phi}$, and combine them with Σ in a way similar to the product of automata; it is then easy to show that the two properties are equivalent to two decidable properties of Petri nets.

An automaton over an alphabet Act is a fourtuple $(Q, q_0, \delta, \mathcal{F})$, where Q is the set of states, q_0 the initial state, $\delta: Q \times Act \to Q$ the transition function and $\mathcal{F}$ the set of final states. Finite and Büchi automata are automata with different acceptance conditions: a finite automaton A accepts a word w in $Act^\star$ if the computation of A on w ends in some final state; a Büchi automaton B accepts a word w in Act^ω if the computation of B on w passes infinitely often through some final state.

Dam provides in [3] a procedure to construct, given a formula ϕ of a different version of the linear time μ-calculus, a Büchi automaton whose language is the denotation of the formula. Dam's version has one single next operator O, instead of an operator O_a for every action a. Given a finite set V of propositional variables, the denotation of a formula with free variables in V is a set of words over the alphabet 2^V. The rules defining the denotation of a formula are like the ones given above for $\neg$, $\wedge$ and greatest fixpoints, plus the following rule for the new next operator:

$$\|O\phi\|\nu = \{\sigma \in Act^\infty \mid \sigma^1 \in \|\phi\|\nu\}$$

We briefly discuss how to adapt Dam's construction to our case. Dam's automaton has $\mathcal{P}(V) \times \mathcal{P}(V)$ as alphabet, where $\mathcal{P}(V)$ is the powerset of V. The automaton is constructed in a compositional way. A word w is accepted by the automaton if and only if there is an accepting run

$$q_0 \xrightarrow{(\alpha_1^+, \alpha_1^-)} q_1 \xrightarrow{(\alpha_2^+, \alpha_2^-)}$$

such that at the ith point of w all variables in α_i^+ hold and no variable in α_i^- holds.

For our version of the linear time μ-calculus, we enrich the alphabet of the automaton to $\mathcal{P}(V) \times \mathcal{P}(V) \times (Act \cup \{\tau\})$, where $\tau \notin Act$. Dam's construction can now be easily modified to take this third component of the alphabet into account. A word w is accepted by the new automaton if and only if there is an accepting run

$$q_0 \xrightarrow{(\alpha_1^+, \alpha_1^-, a_1)} q_1 \xrightarrow{(\alpha_2^+, \alpha_2^-, a_2)}$$

such that at the ith point of w all variables in α_i^+ hold, no variable in α_i^- holds, and the third component of w at this point is a_i.

If ϕ is a closed formula, we choose $V = \emptyset$; then, the automaton we obtain has just $Act \cup \{\tau\}$ as alphabet. The rôle of the action τ is the following: in our case, the Büchi automaton does not accept exactly $\|\phi\|$, because $\|\phi\|$ may contain finite words (for instance, $a \in \|O_a tt\|$), while a Büchi automaton only accepts infinite ones. If $\|\phi\|$ contains a finite word w, then the automaton accepts $w\,\tau^\omega$. The action τ only appears in transitions of the form (q, τ, q).

Proposition 1.

Let ϕ be a closed formula of the linear time μ-calculus over a a set of actions Act. There exist a Büchi automaton B with alphabet $Act \cup \{\tau\}$ which accepts a word w iff $w \in \|\phi\| \cap Act^\omega$ or $w = w'\tau^\omega$ and $w' \in \|\phi\| \cap Act^\star$.

Proof:

Use Dam's construction with the modifications discussed above. ∎

It is convenient for our analysis to split the automaton B of Proposition 1 into a finite automaton which accepts the finite words of $\|\phi\|$ and a Büchi automaton which accepts the infinite ones.

Proposition 2.

Let ϕ be a closed formula of the linear time μ-calculus over a set of actions Act. There exist a finite automaton A_ϕ and a Büchi automaton B_ϕ, both with alphabet Act, such that $L(A_\phi) = \|\phi\| \cap Act^\star$, and $L(B_\phi) = \|\phi\| \cap Act^\omega$.

Proof:

A_ϕ and B_ϕ are the same automaton (i.e., they differ only in the acceptance condition), obtained by just removing the transitions of the form (q, τ, q) from δ. ∎

We now assign to a given automaton a Petri net. Let $A = (Q, q_0, \delta, \mathcal{F})$ be an automaton over an alphabet Act. The labeled Petri net $\Sigma^A = (S, T, F, M_0, l)$ – with labels on Act – is defined as follows:

$$S = Q$$
$$T = \delta$$

$$F = \{(q,(q,a,q')),((q,a,q'),q') \mid (q,a,q') \in \delta\}$$

$$M_0(q) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } q = q_0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$l((q,a,q')) = a$$

It follows immediately from this construction that the finite automaton A_ϕ accepts a word σ if and only if σ is an occurrence sequence of the Petri net Σ^{A_ϕ} leading to a marking in which some final state is marked (recall that the places of Σ^{A_ϕ} are the states of A). Similarly, B_ϕ accepts a word σ if and only if σ is an infinite occurrence sequence such that infinitely many intermediate markings along the sequence put one token in some of the final states of B_ϕ. If $T_\mathcal{F}$ is the set of input transitions of these states, then an equivalent condition is that σ contains infinitely many occurrences of some transition of $T_\mathcal{F}$.

Let $\Sigma_1 = (S_1, T_1, F_1, l_1, M_{01})$, $\Sigma_2 = (S_2, T_2, F_2, l_2, M_{02})$ be two labelled Petri nets with disjoint sets of nodes. The labelled Petri net $\Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2 = (S, T, F, l, M_0)$ is defined as follows:

$$S = S_1 \cup S_2$$

$$T = \{\{t_1, t_2\} \mid t_1 \in T_1 \wedge t_2 \in T_2 \wedge l_1(t_1) = l_2(t_2)\}$$

$$F = (S \times T) \cap \{(s,\{t_1,t_2\}) \mid (s,t_1) \in F_1 \vee (s,t_2) \in F_2\}$$
$$\cup\, (S \times T) \cap \{(\{t_1,t_2\},s) \mid (t_1,s) \in F_1 \vee (t_2,s) \in F_2\}$$

$$M_0(s) = \begin{cases} M_{01}(s) & \text{if } s \in S_1 \\ M_{02}(s) & \text{if } s \in S_2 \end{cases}$$

$$l(\{t_1,t_2\}) = l_1(t_1)$$

Observe that this product operation is very similar to the usual product of automata.

Every marking M of $\Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2$ projects onto a marking M_1 of Σ_1 and a marking M_2 of Σ_2; moreover, these two projections determine M. Making use of this property, we denote $M = (M_1, M_2)$. So, in particular, $M_0 = (M_{01}, M_{02})$.

The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the definitions and the occurrence rule for Petri nets.

Lemma 3.
$(M_1, M_2) \xrightarrow{\sigma} (M_1', M_2')$ iff $M_1 \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_1'$ and $M_2 \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_2'$. (where M_1, M_1' are markings of Σ_1 and M_2, M_2' markings of σ_2)

Proof:
($\Rightarrow$): Let $\{t_1,u_1\}\,\{t_2,u_2\}\ldots$ be the sequence of transitions of $\Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2$ underlying σ. Then, $t_1\,t_2\ldots$ and $u_1\,u_2\ldots$ are sequences of transitions underlying the occurrence sequence σ in Σ_1 and Σ_2, respectively.
($\Leftarrow$): Similar to ($\Rightarrow$). ■

We can now reduce $L(\Sigma) \cap L(B_\phi) \neq \emptyset$ to a property of the Petri net $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{B_\phi}$.

Lemma 4.

$L(\Sigma) \cap L(B_\phi) \neq \emptyset$ iff $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{B_\phi}$ has an occurrence sequence which contains infinitely many occurrences of some transition $\{t, u\}$, where $u \in T_\mathcal{F}$.

Proof:

($\Rightarrow$): Let σ be a word of $L(\Sigma) \cap L(B_\phi)$. Then σ is the sequence of labels of two occurrence sequences in Σ and Σ^{B_ϕ}; moreover, σ contains infinitely many occurrences of some transition u of $T_\mathcal{F}$. By Lemma 3, σ is the sequence of labels of an occurrence sequence in $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{B_\phi}$, in which transitions of the form $\{t, u\}$ occur infinitely often.

($\Leftarrow$): Let $(M_{01}, M_{02}) \xrightarrow{\sigma}$ be an infinite occurrence sequence of $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{B_\phi}$ which contains infinitely many occurrences of of some transition $\{t, u\}$, where $u \in T_\mathcal{F}$. By Lemma 3, $M_{02} \xrightarrow{\sigma}$ is an occurrence sequence of Σ^{B_ϕ}. Let $M_{02} \xrightarrow{a_1} M_1 \xrightarrow{a_2} M_2 \xrightarrow{a_3} \ldots$ be the full representation of $M_{02} \xrightarrow{\sigma}$. By the definition of Σ^{B_ϕ}, each marking M_i puts one token in exactly one place of Σ^{B_ϕ}, and no tokens in the rest. So each marking M_i is univoquely associated to a state of B_ϕ, and the whole sequence to a computation. The state associated to the markings succeeding an occurrence of $\{t, u\}$ is a final state of B_ϕ; so B_ϕ accepts σ. ■

The condition on $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{B_\phi}$ of Lemma 4 was shown to be decidable by Jantzen and Valk [4]. Yen shows in [17] that it is decidable within exponential space.

Lemma 5. *[17]*

Let Σ be a Petri net with n nodes, and let T_0 be a subset of transitions of Σ. It can be decided in $O(2^{c \cdot n \cdot \log n})$ space, for some constant c, if some infinite occurrence sequence of Σ contains infinitely many occurrences of some transition of T_0. ■

Proof:

There exists such an infinite occurrence sequence iff there exists a finite occurrence sequence $M_0 \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} M_1 \xrightarrow{\sigma_2} M_2$ such that $M_1 \leq M_2$ and σ_2 contains some occurrence of a transition of T_0 (then M_1 enables the sequence σ_2^ω). This can be expressed as a formula on paths of Petri nets which belongs to the class of formulas defined by Yen in [17]. Yen shows that any of these formulas can be decided using the space indicated in the lemma. ■

$L(\Sigma) \cap L(A_\phi) \neq \emptyset$ can also be reduced to a suitable property of $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{A_\phi}$

Lemma 6.

$L(\Sigma) \cap L(A_\phi) \neq \emptyset$ iff there exists a reachable dead marking of $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{A_\phi}$ which puts one token in some final state of A_ϕ.

Proof:

($\Rightarrow$): Let σ be a word of $L(\Sigma) \cap L(A_\phi)$. Then, $M_{01} \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_1$ in Σ and $M_{02} \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_2$ in Σ^{A_ϕ}; moreover, M_1 is a dead marking of Σ, and M_2 puts a token in some final state of A_ϕ. By Lemma 3, $(M_{01}, M_{02}) \xrightarrow{\sigma} (M_1, M_2)$ is an occurrence sequence of $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{A_\phi}$. Since M_1 is a dead marking of Σ, (M_1, M_2) is a dead marking of $\Sigma \times \Sigma^{A_\phi}$.

($\Leftarrow$): Let $(M_{01}, M_{02}) \xrightarrow{\sigma} (M_1, M_2)$ be an occurrence sequence of Σ such that (M_1, M_2) is a dead marking, and M_2 puts a token in some final state of A_ϕ. By Lemma 3, $M_{02} \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_2$ is an occurrence sequence of Σ^{A_ϕ}, and therefore $\sigma \in L(A_\phi)$.

It remains to prove that σ belongs to the language of Σ, i.e., that $M_{01} \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_1$ is a maximal occurrence sequence of Σ.

Assume this is not the case. Then there exists an occurrence sequence $M_{01} \xrightarrow{\sigma} M_1 \xrightarrow{a} M_1'$. Let t be the transition underlying the occurrence of a. By the definition of A_ϕ, a belongs to the alphabet of A_ϕ, and therefore to the alphabet of Σ^{A_ϕ} as well. So Σ^{A_ϕ} contains a transition (q, a, q'), where q is the final state marked at M_2. This transition is enabled at M_2. By Lemma 3, $\{t, (q, a, q')\}$ is enabled at (M_1, M_2), which contradicts that (M_1, M_2) is a dead marking. ■

The existence of the dead marking of lemma 6 can be decided by solving an exponential number of instances of the *submarking reachability problem* [5]. Given a net with a set of places S, a *submarking* of the net is a *partial* mapping from S onto $\mathbb{N}$. The submarking reachability problem is the problem of deciding, given a Petri net $\Sigma = (N, M_0)$ and a submarking P of N, if some reachable marking coincides with P on all the places where P is defined. The submarking reachability problem is reducible (in polynomial time) to the reachability problem [5].

Lemma 7.

Let Σ be a Petri net, and let S_0 be a subset of places of Σ. It is decidable if some dead marking of Σ puts a token on some place of S_0.

Proof:

If M is a dead marking, then for every transition t some input place of t is unmarked at M. The set of submarkings which specify that, for every transition t, some input place of t is unmarked, and moreover that some place of S contains one token, is finite: it contains at most $|S|^{|T|} \cdot |S_0|$ elements, where S, T are the sets of places and transitions of the net. The property of the lemma can then be decided by solving the submarking reachability problem for these sets. ■

The complexity of the reachability problem is still open. The most efficient algorithm is not primitive recursive, while the best known lower bound is exponential space [11]. If exponential space suffices, then the complexities of deciding $L(\Sigma) \cap L(B_\phi) = \emptyset$ and $L(\Sigma) \cap L(A_\phi) = \emptyset$ are similar. Otherwise, deciding the second property is more involved.

Theorem 8.

Let Σ be a labelled Petri net, and let ϕ be a closed formula of the linear time μ-calculus. It is decidable if Σ satisfies ϕ.

Proof:

Σ satisfies ϕ iff $L(\Sigma) \subseteq \|\phi\|$, or, by the semantics of negation, iff $L(\Sigma) \cap \|\neg\phi\| = \emptyset$.

By Proposition 2, $L(\Sigma) \cap ||\neg\phi|| = \emptyset$ iff $L(\Sigma) \cap L(A_{\neg\phi}) = \emptyset$ and $L(\Sigma) \cap L(B_{\neg\phi}) = \emptyset$. Use then Lemmas 4, 5, 6 and 7. ■

5 Adding Atomic Sentences

It is well known that Petri nets have less computing power than Turing machines. In particular, it is impossible to construct a Petri net model of a counter. Crudely speaking, the reason is that Petri nets cannot 'test for zero'. This means that it is not possible in general to add new places and transitions to a given Petri net having a distinguished place s, in such a way that (1) the behaviour of the old net is not disturbed, and (2) one of the new transitions is enabled exactly when s is *not* marked. If Petri nets are enriched with inhibitor arcs, which allow to 'test for zero', they become Turing powerful [14].

Instead of enriching Petri nets, we can enrich the linear time μ-calculus, and allow it to 'test for zero': it suffices to supplement the logic with atomic sentences of the form $s = 0$, meaning 'the place s contains no tokens at the current marking'. We show that this addition makes the model checking problem undecidable, even for formulas with one single fixpoint and for a small class of unlabelled Petri nets. The proof is by reduction from the halting problem for register machines; it is a modification of Bradfield's construction in [1].

Let us start by giving the semantics of the extended logic. We interpret the sentence $s = 0$ on Petri nets $\Sigma = (N, M_0)$ having a place s. We then extend valuations in the following way:

$$\mathcal{V}(s = 0) = \{\sigma \in L((N, M)) \mid M(s) = 0\}$$

A register machine $\mathcal{R}$ is a tuple

$$(\{q_0, \ldots, q_{n+1}\}, \{R_1, \ldots, R_m\}, \{\delta_0, \ldots, \delta_n\})$$

where R_i are the registers, q_i are the states with q_0 being the initial state and q_{n+1} the unique halting state, and δ_i is the transition rule for state q_i $(0 \leq i \leq n)$: δ_i is either (1) '$R_j := R_j + 1$; goto q_k' for some j, k, or (2) 'if $R_j = 0$' then goto q_k else ($R_j := R_j - 1$; goto $q_{k'}$)' for some j, k, k'. We denote the set of transition rules of the first and second kind by Δ_1 and Δ_2, respectively. The register R_j used by δ_i is denoted by $reg(\delta_i)$.

The halting problem for register machines is defined thus: given a register machine $\mathcal{R}$ and a set $v_1, \ldots, v_m$ of nonnegative integers, to decide if the computation of $\mathcal{R}$ with the registers initialised to $v_1, \ldots, v_m$ ever reaches the halting state. This problem is known to be undecidable [13], even for machines with only two registers.

We define an unlabelled net $N_{\mathcal{R}}$ as follows: the places of $N_{\mathcal{R}}$ are

$$q_0, \ldots, q_n, R_1, \ldots, R_m.$$

For every register R_i the net contains two transitions $inc(R_i)$, $dec(R_i)$, such that ${}^\bullet inc(R_i) = dec(R_i) = \emptyset$ and $inc(R_i)^\bullet = {}^\bullet dec(R_i) = \{R_i\}$. The rest of the

transitions and the flow relation are determined by the δ_i: if $\delta_i \in \Delta_1$, then there is a transition δ_i^+ with ${}^\bullet\delta_i^+ = \{q_i\}$ and $\delta_i^{+\bullet} = \{q_k\}$; and if $\delta_i \in \Delta_2$, then there are transitions δ_i^0 and δ_i^- such that ${}^\bullet\delta_i^0 = {}^\bullet\delta_i^- = \{q_i\}$, $\delta_i^{0\bullet} = \{q_k\}$ and $\delta_i^{-\bullet} = \{q_{k'}\}$. Finally, there is a transition *halt*, such that ${}^\bullet halt = \{q_{n+1}\}$ and $halt^\bullet = \emptyset$.

Observe that every transition of $N_\mathcal{R}$ has at most one input place and at most one output place.

If we put $v_1, \ldots, v_m$ tokens in the places $R_1, \ldots, R_m$ of $N_\mathcal{R}$, and one token in the place q_0, then an occurrence sequence of the Petri net so obtained simulates the computation of $\mathcal{R}$ on the initial values $v_1, \ldots, v_m$. It is namely the sequence in which an occurrence of δ_i^+ (δ_i^-) is always followed by the occurrence of the transition $inc(reg(\delta_i))$ ($dec(reg(\delta_i))$), and in which a transition δ_i^0 occurs only at markings in which the place $reg(\delta_i)$ contains no tokens. There exist, however, many other occurrence sequences which do not correspond to any computation.

Define the formula $halt(\mathcal{R})$ as:

$$\mu Z.\ O_{halt}\ tt$$
$$\bigvee_{\delta_i \in \Delta_1} O_{\delta_i^+} O_{inc(reg(i))} Z$$
$$\bigvee_{\delta_i \in \Delta_2} (reg(\delta_i) = 0 \ \wedge\ O_{\delta_i^0} Z) \ \vee\ O_{\delta_i^-} O_{dec(reg(i))} Z$$

Theorem 9.

Let $\mathcal{R}$ be a register machine, and let $v_1, \ldots, v_m$ be initial values for the registers of $\mathcal{R}$. Let $\Sigma_\mathcal{R} = (N_\mathcal{R}, M)$ be a Petri net, where M is the marking that puts v_i tokens on the place R_i and one token on the place q_0. $\mathcal{R}$ halts for these initial values iff $\Sigma_\mathcal{R}$ does not satisfy $\neg halt(\mathcal{R})$.

Proof:

Σ_R satisfies $\neg halt(\mathcal{R})$ iff $L(\Sigma_\mathcal{R}) \subseteq ||\neg halt(\mathcal{R})||$ iff $L(\Sigma_\mathcal{R}) \cap ||halt(\mathcal{R})|| = \emptyset$. Let σ be a sequence of $||halt(\mathcal{R})||$. It follows from the semantics of the linear time μ-calculus that $\sigma = \sigma_1 \ldots \sigma_k\ halt$, where every σ_i is of the form $\delta_i^+\ inc(reg(\delta_i))$, $\delta_i^-\ dec(reg(\delta_i))$ or δ_i^0. Moreover, whenever we have $M_1 \xrightarrow{\delta_i^0} M_2$ along the occurrence sequence corresponding to σ, $M_1(reg(\delta_i)) = 0$. Such an ocurrence sequence simulates a halting computation of the register machine. Conversely, from a halting computation of the register machine we can easily obtain a sequence of $halt(\mathcal{R})$. So $L(\Sigma_\mathcal{R}) \cap ||halt(\mathcal{R})|| \neq \emptyset$ iff $\mathcal{R}$ halts with input $v_1, \ldots, v_m$. ■

As mentioned above, the transitions of the Petri nets derived from register machines have at most one input place and at most one output place. In particular, they are Petri net representations of Basic Parallel Processes, a subset of CCS [2].

It seems difficult to find an interesting class of Petri nets with infinite state spaces, and properly included in the class derived from register machines. Since the formula $halt(\mathcal{R})$ is also rather simple, this undecidability result seems to determine the decidability border rather neatly.

6 Branching Time Logics

The modal μ-calculus, has the same syntax as the linear time μ-calculus (although $O_a\phi$ is usually replaced by $\langle a\rangle\phi$), but is interpreted on labelled transition systems. Let $\mathcal{T} = (\mathcal{S}, \xrightarrow{a}_{a\in Act})$ be a labelled transition system. Given a valuation $\mathcal{V}$ that assigns to each variable a subset of $\mathcal{S}$, the denotation of a formula is defined by the following rules:

$$\begin{aligned}
\|Z\|_{\mathcal{V}} &= \mathcal{V}(Z)\\
\|\neg\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}} &= \mathcal{S} - \|\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}}\\
\|\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2\|_{\mathcal{V}} &= \|\phi_1\|_{\mathcal{V}} \cap \|\phi_2\|_{\mathcal{V}}\\
\|\langle a\rangle\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}} &= \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \exists s' \in \mathcal{S}.s \xrightarrow{a} s' \wedge s' \in \|\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}}\}\\
\|\nu Z.\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}} &= \bigcup\{A \subseteq \mathcal{S} \mid A \subseteq \|\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}[A/Z]}\}
\end{aligned}$$

As in the case of the linear time μ-calculus, the denotation of a closed formula is independent of the valuation.

Given a labelled Petri net $\Sigma = (N, M_0)$, the transition system associated to Σ, denoted by $\mathcal{T}(\Sigma)$, has the set of reachable markings as states; there is a transition labelled by a between two markings M_1, M_2 if and only if $M_1 \xrightarrow{a} M_2$. We say that Σ satisfies a formula ϕ if $M_0 \in \|\phi\|_{\mathcal{V}}$.

It is undecidable if a Petri net satisfies a formula. In order to prove it, it suffices to proceed as for the linear time μ-calculus, but change in the formula $halt(\mathcal{R})$ the atomic sentence $reg(\delta_i) = 0$ into the formula $\neg\langle dec(reg(\delta_i))\rangle tt$. Observe that $\|\langle dec(reg(\delta_i))\rangle tt\|$ are the markings which enable the transition $dec(reg(\delta_i))$, which are exactly the markings that put no tokens on $reg(\delta_i)$. So, in fact, in the modal μ-calculus we can 'test for zero' without having to add atomic sentences.

In spite of its simplicity, this undecidability result has a consequence which may be a little bit surprising. For the class of Basic Parallel Processes (BPPs), bisimulation equivalence has been shown to be decidable [2]; moreover, since BPPs are image-finite, two Basic Parallel Processes are bisimilar if and only if they satisfy the same properties of the modal μ-calculus. So it is decidable if two BPPs satisfy the same properties. However, the model checking problem is undecidable.

Since the μ-calculus is known to be an extremely powerful logic, it could be expected to find some weaker but interesting, decidable logic. Unfortunately, there is little hope of obtaining such a result: we now show that one of the weakest non-trivial branching time logics is still undecidable. It extends propositional logic with an operator $\Diamond_a$ for each action a of the set Act. The syntax is:

$$\phi ::= tt \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \Diamond_a\phi$$

Formulas are interpreted on a transition system $\mathcal{T} = (\mathcal{S}, \xrightarrow{a}_{a\in Act})$. Define $\stackrel{a}{\Longrightarrow}$ as the relation $(\bigcup_{b\in Act} \xrightarrow{b})^\star \xrightarrow{a}$. The denotation of a formula ϕ is a set

of states $||\phi||$ defined according to the following rules:

$$
\begin{aligned}
||tt|| &= \mathcal{S} \\
||\neg\phi|| &= \mathcal{S} - ||\phi|| \\
||\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2|| &= ||\phi_1|| \cap ||\phi_2|| \\
||\Diamond_a \phi|| &= \{s \in \mathcal{S} \mid \exists s' \in \mathcal{S}. s \stackrel{a}{\Longrightarrow} s' \wedge s' \in ||\phi||\}
\end{aligned}
$$

(see [1] for an embedding of this logic in the modal μ-calculus)

When interpreted on Petri nets, a marking satisfies $\Diamond_a \phi$ if it enables some sequence $\sigma\ a$, whose occurrence leads to a marking which satisfies ϕ. We use the abbreviation $\Box_a = \neg\Diamond_a\neg$. A marking M satisfies $\Box_a\phi$ if every sequence $\sigma\ a$ enabled at M leads to a marking satisfying ϕ.

We prove undecidability by a reduction from the *containment problem*. An instance of the problem consists of two Petri nets Σ_1, Σ_2 with the same number of places, and a bijection f between the sets of places of Σ_1 and Σ_2. f can be extended to a bijection between markings in the obvious way. The question to decide is whether for every reachable marking M of Σ_1, $f(M)$ is a reachable marking of Σ_2. Rabin showed that this problem is undecidable; the proof can be found in [5].

Let Σ_1, Σ_2 and f be an instance of the containment problem, and let S_1, S_2 be the sets of places of Σ_1, Σ_2. Assume also, without loss of generality, that the sets of nodes of Σ_1 and Σ_2 are disjoint. We construct an unlabelled Petri net $\Sigma = (N, M_0)$ in several stages. At each stage we add some places and transitions. For transitions we use the notation $X \to Y$, meaning that the transition t has the sets X and Y of places as preset and postset, respectively (the flow relation is thus specified at the same time as the set of transitions). To give a transition $X \to Y$ the name t, we write $t: X \to Y$.

Add $\Sigma_1 \cup \Sigma_2$.

Add three places A, B, C, and two transitions $t_{AB}: \{A\} \cup S_1 \quad \{B\} \cup S_1$ and $t_{BC}: \{B\} \cup S_2 \to \{C\} \cup S_2$. Put one token on A, and no tokens on B and C.

For every place s of Σ_1, add a transition $\{s, f(s), C\} \to \{C\}$.

For every place s added so far, with the exception of C, add a transition $\{s\} \to \{s\}$.

Every marking M of Σ projects onto a marking M_1 of Σ_1, a marking M_2 of Σ_2, and a marking M_3 of the three places A, B and C; moreover, these three projections determine M. Making use of this property, we write $M = (M_1, M_2, M_3)$; also, we write M_3 as a string of three numbers representing the number of tokens in A, B, and C. Finally, the null marking, i.e., the marking that puts no token in any place, is denoted by $\mathbf{0}$.

The following lemma follows easily from the definition of Σ.

Lemma 10.

If $(M_{01}, M_{02}, 100) \xrightarrow{\sigma} (M_1, M_2, 001)$ *is an occurrence sequence of* Σ, *then there exist sequences* $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3$ *such that* $\sigma = \sigma_1\, t_{AB} \sigma_2\, t_{BC}\, \sigma_3$. ■

We can now characterise the 'yes' instances of the containment problem in terms of occurrence sequences of Σ.

Lemma 11.

Σ_1, Σ_2, f *is a 'yes' instance of the containment problem iff every occurrence sequence* $(M_{01}, M_{02}, 100) \xrightarrow{\sigma\, t_{AB}} (M_1, M_{02}, 010)$ *of* Σ *can be extended to a maximal occurrence sequence* $(M_{01}, M_{02}, 100) \xrightarrow{\sigma\, t_{AB}\, \tau} (0, 0, 001)$.

Proof:

($\Rightarrow$): M_1 is a reachable marking of Σ_1. Since M_1 is reachable in Σ_2 as well, there exists a sequence $\sigma_2\, t_{BC}$ such that

$$(M_1, M_{02}, 010) \xrightarrow{\sigma_2\, t_{BC}} (M_1, M_1, 001)$$

Let σ_3 be a sequence which contains each transition of the form $\{s, f(s), C\} \rightarrow \{C\}$ $M(s)$ times, and no occurrence of any other transition. We then have $(M_1, M_1, 001) \xrightarrow{\sigma_3} (0, 0, 001)$. By the definition of Σ, no transition is enabled at the marking $(0, 0, 001)$, and therefore

$$(M_0, M_0, 100) \xrightarrow{\sigma\, t_{AB}\, \sigma_2\, t_{BC}\, \sigma_3} (0, 0, 001)$$

is maximal.

($\Leftarrow$): Let M_1 be a reachable marking of Σ_1. Then, we have

$$(M_{01}, M_{02}, 100) \xrightarrow{\sigma_1} (M_1, M_{02}, 100) \xrightarrow{t_{AB}} (M_1, M_{02}, 010)$$

for some sequence σ_1. So there exists a sequence τ such that

$$(M_{01}, M_{02}, 010) \xrightarrow{\sigma\, t_{AB}\, \tau} (0, 0, 001)$$

is a maximal occurrence sequence. By Lemma 10, $\tau = \sigma_2\, t_{BC}\, \sigma_3$ for some sequences σ_2 and σ_3. Let

$$(M_1, M_{02}, 010) \xrightarrow{\sigma_2\, t_{BC}} (M_1', M_2, 010) \xrightarrow{\sigma_3} (0, 0, 100)$$

We show $M_1' = M_1 = M_2$, which proves that M_1 is reachable in Σ_2.

Since σ_2 occurs after t_{AB} has occurred, no transition of Σ_1 occurs in σ_2. So $M_1' = M_1$.

Since σ_3 occurs after t_{BC}, only transitions of the form $\{s\} \rightarrow \{s\}$ for some place s can occur in σ_3. Since these transitions remove one token from s and one from $f(s)$, we have $M_1' - 0 = M_2 - 0$. So $M_1' = M_2$. ■

To finish the undecidability proof, it suffices to encode the characterisation of Lemma 11 into the temporal logic defined above. Define the operator $\Diamond$ as $\bigvee_{a \in Act} \Diamond_a$. It follows from the semantics of the logic that $\Diamond\phi$ holds at a marking M if and only if some succesor marking M', $M' \neq M$ satisfies ϕ. In particular, $\Diamond\, tt$ holds at a marking M if and only if M has some successor, i.e., it is not dead.

Theorem 12.

Σ_1, Σ_2, f is a 'yes' instance of the containment problem iff Σ satisfies the formula

$$\Box_{t_{AB}} \Diamond \neg \Diamond tt.$$

Proof:

$\neg \Diamond tt$ holds at a marking M iff M enables no transition. Therefore, the formula of the theorem states that every occurrence sequence $\sigma_1 t_{AB}$ of Σ can be extended to an occurrence sequence $\sigma_1 t_{AB} \tau$ leading to a marking at which no transition of Σ is enabled. By the definition of Σ, this marking can only be $(0, 0, 001)$. Apply then Lemma 11. ■

7 Conclusions

We have examined the decidability of the model checking problem for several μ-calculi and Petri nets. The decidability border turns out to be rather neat: if we consider μ-calculi without atomic sentences, the whole linear time μ-calculus is decidable, while a very weak branching time subset of the modal μ-calculus is undecidable. The addition of very simple atomic sentences makes the linear time μ-calculus undecidable, even for formulas with one fixpoint and Petri nets in which every transition has at most one input and at most one output place.

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